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I. INTRODUCTION
His heart was steadily beating faster and his palms were
beginning to sweat.1
Even though he was an experienced
highwayman, he never lost the nervousness that came right before he
approached his victims. Perched atop his horse and shielded from
view by the trees, he could see the coach approaching and could
already tell that this meeting would yield enough to last him a month
if he were to succeed. As the coach came around the bend, he took
one quick breath, quickly pulled his mask over his face, and in one
swift motion galloped forward from his hiding place amongst the
trees to block the path. “Stop, and hand over your belongings!” he
shouted, brandishing his pistol. The travelers, almost frozen in fear,
slowly got out and emptied their pockets.
The above is a fictional account of a highway robbery during
England’s early days. Dating from the medieval times and into the
nineteenth century, England’s roads were ripe with highwaymen
ready to take advantage of unsuspecting travelers.2 In those days,
robberies were much simpler—they occurred on the open highways
and the victim knew exactly what was being taken. Today, in a
world of free-flowing information and technology, things are much
less simple. In an age in which intangible items, such as information,
have as much value as tangible items, thieves have turned their focus
from the real-world highway to the information highway.
The advent of technology and the Internet has brought
unprecedented change to life as we know it.3
Today, we

1

This is an imagined account of a highway robbery in eighteenth century
England. See Rictor Norton, Highwaymen: Jack Hawkins, Sixteen-String Jack &
Gentleman
James
Maclean,
THE
GEORGIAN
UNDERWORLD,
http://rictornorton.co.uk/gu08.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2012).
2
Highwaymen of the Peak, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/
eastmidlands/series3/travellers_highwaymen_derbyshire_peakdistrict.shtml
(last
updated Mar. 2006).
3
In response to predictions that “[c]ommerce and business will shift from
offices and malls to networks and modems,” author Clifford Stoll once commented:
“Baloney. Do our computer pundits lack all common sense? The truth i[s] no
online database will replace your daily newspaper . . . and no computer network
will change the way government works.” Clifford Stoll, The Internet? Bah!,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 1995), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek
/1995/02/26/the-internet-bah.html. Time has proven these comments false.
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communicate through the use of email and Skype; we buy products
online; and we bank online.4 The Internet has become a source that
keeps us informed of current events, facilitates commercial
transactions, and provides a means for social interaction. However,
the Internet is a double-edged sword. Although it has made our lives
easier in many respects, it has also created new problems. One of the
merits of the Internet—the free flow of information—is also one of
its greatest flaws. Anyone with the proper know-how can gain access
to a user’s most personal and valuable information.5 In addition,
these hackers can range from your average suburban kid to
government agencies.6 Unlike in the past, the things a person may

Indeed, few could have predicted the leaps and bounds that have been made by
technology and the Internet. See id.
4
Not only has the Internet changed our daily lives, it has also changed the
way government works. Technology has forced government to work within the
framework of the cyber world. Most notably, the Obama campaign in 2008 relied
heavily on the Internet to reach out to voters. See Steve Schifferes, Internet Key to
Obama
Victories,
BBC
NEWS
(June
12,
2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7412045.stm; See also Claire Cain Miller, How
Obama’s Internet Campaign Changed Politics, NEW YORK TIMES BITS (Nov. 7,
2008, 7:49 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/how-obamas-internetcampaign-changed-politics/.
5
Because of the nature of the Internet, it is impossible not to store any
information about oneself online. Whether it be on a social networking site, on
online banking, or on an Amazon account, each person has left some amount of
personal information on the Internet. This, in turn, makes people more susceptible
to identity theft. In fact, there is a huge market for stolen credit card numbers.
Stolen cards, along with the names and addresses on the card, are sold on forums
for those who know where to look and are sold for about five to ten dollars apiece.
See Nick Bilton, How Credit Card Data Is Stolen and Sold, NEW YORK TIMES
(May 3, 2011, 3:30 P.M.), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/card-data-isstolen-and-sold/.
6
Early in 2012, it was reported that a group of high school juniors in
southern California had hacked into their teacher’s computers in order to change
the grades of students who were willing to pay for their “services.” See Dennis
Romero, Rich Kids Hack Computers to Change Grades at Palos Verdes High but
are Busted by Cops, L.A. WEEKLY BLOGS (Jan. 27, 2012, 12:32 PM),
http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2012/01/palos_verdes_grade_change_computer
_scandal_high_school.php.
In contrast, some hackers operate for the government and gather
information as intelligence. See Tabassum Zakaria, U.S. Blames China, Russia for
Cyber
Espionage,
REUTERS
(Nov.
3,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/03/us-usa-cyber-china-
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own today are not only limited to physical forms. In this
technological age, a person’s possessions may also take on a digital
form; and with this transition from the physical to the digital has
come a stealthier form of theft that is much different from face-toface hold-ups. Unlike the days of yore, the online security breaches
of the modern age happen right under the victim’s nose without her
knowledge, and it is often difficult to realize the full extent of the
harm until much, much later.7
With the pattern of current events, it is even more difficult to
ignore the growing problem of security breaches. A security breach
that has recently garnered much attention in the press is the hacker
group Anonymous’s breach into think-tank Stratfor’s database.8 The
hacking group was able to obtain the email addresses and other
personal data of Stratfor’s 860,000 subscribers, which included highprofile government officials.9 The result was not only a nightmare
for the subscribers, but for the United States as well, with an analyst
for independent research institute, U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit,
John Bumgarner stating, “[w]e can assume that a foreign intelligence
service has already taken advantage of this information.”10 To add
insult to injury, it was later discovered that Stratfor’s data protection

idUSTRE7A23FX20111103. In 2011, the U.S. accused China and Russia of
engaging in cyber espionage. Id. It is believed that foreign countries target the
U.S. for trade secrets in order to gain “parity with the United States” Id. National
Counterintelligence Executive, Robert Bryant emphasized the danger it posed to
the U.S., stating: “Trade secrets developed over thousands of working hours by our
brightest minds are stolen in a split second and transferred to our competitors." Id.
7
American Greed: Cybercrime (CNBC television broadcast May 5,
2010), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTVJ9rpwiFQ (Starting at
17:39, Julie, a victim of stolen credit card information describes the effect it has
had on her life. She has had to spend countless hours resolving problems arising
from theft of her information.). See also Nicole Perlroth, Finding a Cleanup Crew
After a Messy Hack Attack, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/technology/hacker-attacks-like-stratforsrequire-fast-response.html (“In the world of computer security, experts say, the
most dangerous breaches are the quiet ones—the ones in which hackers make off
with a company’s intellectual property and leave no trace.”).
8
See Ken Dilanian, Hackers Reveal Personal Data of 860,000 Stratfor
subscribers, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
jan/04/nation/la-na-cyber-theft-20120104.
9
Id.
10
Id.

814

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

left much to be desired. The company’s files were unencrypted,11
and an individual was able to crack user’s passwords using simple
off-the-shelf software.12 Due to its faulty data protection, Stratfor
lost highly confidential information that was costly to both its
consumers and the country.
This example of a security breach serves as a testament to the
far-reaching consequences of poor data protection. If a system does
not have adequate data protection, it can easily be hacked. Then, the
hacker will gain access to information belonging to multitudes of
people, agencies, and groups. These recent developments beg the
question: What does this mean for the future of America’s data
protection practices? Should the government play a role in regulating
data protection to ensure that its citizens’ data are adequately
protected?
The current framework for U.S. data protection is based upon
a “sectoral model” in which various laws aimed at different sectors of
industry are used to protect personal information. This model relies
upon a combination of legislation, regulation, and self-regulation in
order to protect data privacy.13 In practice, this is how the sectoral
model works: Congress passes legislation and, through the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce, monitors the
businesses targeted by the legislation. However, these laws are
narrow in scope and are careful not to infringe too much on the
marketplace’s role in privacy regulation.14 While the model does
include the use of legislation, it primarily relies upon industry
practice, codes of conduct, and the marketplace in order to protect
data privacy.15 Reliance on legislation to provide data protection is
secondary to reliance on industry practice to protect data. 16 The
rationale is that businesses are in the best position to make data
11

Zoe Fox, ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Hit Security Group, CNN (Dec. 26,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/26/tech/web/anonymous-hackstratfor/index.html. It appears that Anonymous targeted Stratfor because it failed
to encrypt credit card data of its clients. Id.
12
Dilanian, supra note 8.
13
See
U.S.-E.U.
Safe
Harbor
Overview,
EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.

Fall 2012

U.S. and EU Data Protection Policies

815

privacy decisions that will suit both their needs and the needs of the
consumer.
Although the U.S.’s sectoral model gives businesses freer rein
in its data collection practices by allowing businesses to pick and
choose how to implement privacy protection laws, some have
wondered whether the sectoral model is the better model or whether
it is even effective at all.17 With online privacy becoming an
increasingly hot topic,18 many are pondering whether it is time for the
U.S. to have its own data protection agency.19 Those who call for
change point to the European Union (EU) and its approach to data
privacy, which is considered to be the most stringent in the world.
Unlike the U.S.’s sectoral model, the EU’s comprehensive model
creates expansive political rights to citizens of member states and
gives control of personal information to the citizen.20 In this way, the
EU model is the exact opposite of the U.S. model of data protection
in that the latter takes control of personal information away from the
consumer and puts it in the hands of businesses.21

17

See Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the
Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1999).
18
Most notably, Facebook has recently been under fire for tracking and
keeping logs of sites that its users visit. See Tiffany McCall, Facebook Privacy
Concerns, WKRG-NEWS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www2.wkrg.com/news/2011/
nov/17/facebook-privacy-concerns-ar-2719783/. Even more recently is the hacking
of security group, Stratfor’s client information. See Zoe Fox, ‘Anonymous’
Hackers
Hit
Security
Group,
CNN
(Dec.
26,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/26/tech/web/anonymous-hack-stratfor/index.html.
19
See generally DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK
FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET
ECONOMY (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf [hereinafter DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE] (In this paper, the Department of Commerce proposed a creation of
an online data protection agency).
20
James M. Assey & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe
Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 150
(2001).
21
Fred H. Cates, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the
European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 207–08 (1999) (“[I]n
the United States, telephone numbers, addresses, Social Security numbers, medical
history, and similar personal identifying data are almost always owned by someone
else—the Post Office, the government, or a physician or hospital.”).
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States within the EU provide their citizens with strong data
privacy rights.22 In fact, data protection is considered a fundamental
right guaranteed to all citizens within the EU states under a law
called Directive 95/46/EC (Directive) that was passed in 1998.23 The
Directive also requires companies to obtain consent from consumers
before collecting, processing, and sharing personal information.24
Further, this EU law allows consumers access to their information in
order to update and change it.25 Essentially, the Directive works to
protect personal data by giving the individual a great deal of control
over her personal information. Lastly, the Directive also works to
provide security by controlling the parties with which an EU
company may trade.26 The Directive only allows for transmission of
data between an EU member and a non-EU party if the party has
“adequate” data protection.27 This requirement is meant to ensure
that data will not be transmitted to a party that will be careless with
the information.28 The basis of the EU model is the idea that data
22

See Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, Art. 28. 1995 O.J. (L 281) (Oct. 24, 1995), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddcc1c74.html [hereinafter Data Directive].
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data 1995 O.J. (L 281).
28
See id. When the Directive was first passed, many, especially the U.S.,
were in an uproar. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR
BUSINESS 191–95 (1998). The restriction on transmission of data between an EU
country and a non-EU country had significant economic consequences, specifically
for those in the financial industry. Id. at 34. Many in the U.S. were afraid that the
EU had created this restriction in order to discriminate against foreign trading
partners, but this matter soon blew over with the Safe Harbor Agreement in 2000.
See id. at 191–95; see also Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://export.gov/safeharbor/.
The Safe Harbor Agreement allowed flow of information between the EU
nations and the U.S. so long as U.S. businesses complied with the requirements set
out in the agreement. In order to qualify for Safe Harbor and trade with a business
located in the EU, a U.S. company must fill out a form on the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s website and certify that the requirements under the Safe Harbor
agreement are met. See Eric Shapiro, All is Not Fair in the Privacy Trade: The
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privacy is a “political right anchored among the panoply of
fundamental human rights and the rights attributed to ‘data subjects'
or citizens.”29
The EU Directive sets up the foundation of EU data privacy
protection, but the way the Directive is enforced depends on the
member state and how it chooses to administer the law. Each state is
given the freedom to decide how it will run its independent agency in
charge of ensuring that data protection policies are being followed
and which laws must be passed in order for it to comply with the
spirit of the Directive. This type of freedom creates differences
among the privacy policy regime that each State enacts. For
instance, France’s independent agency is chaired by members who
hold additional positions in the federal government while the United
Kingdom’s independent agency is chaired by members who do not
hold additional positions within government.
This paper seeks to explore the question of how much we
should borrow from the EU model of data protection. In order to
determine whether the EU’s system is appropriate for the U.S. to
imitate, it is helpful first to examine the Directive, and second to
analyze its implementation by EU member states. The two EU
member states that will be examined are the U.K. and France. These
two countries were chosen as part of the analysis because of their
unique and different approaches to the Directive’s implementation.
Most importantly, both countries approach data protection using
different levels of government interference and have defined
government regulation in contrasting ways. In order to truly
understand the options available to the U.S. if it were to implement
the EU approach, it is important to see how the EU states,
themselves, have implemented the approach.
The first section of this paper will examine the historical
differences that have led to the American approach to privacy and the
European approach to privacy. The second section will examine the
current U.S. model, and the third section will examine the EU model.
Next, the fourth section will compare and contrast the two models.

Safe Harbor Agreement and the World Trade Organization, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2781, 2786 (2003) (arguing that the Safe Harbor Agreement has a very lax standard
that does not ask much of U.S. companies).
29
Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 20, at 145, 148.

818

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

Finally, the last section will argue that the U.S. should have a
regulatory agency and describe how that should look and run.
II. EXISTING U.S. MODEL
The current U.S. sectoral model of data protection was also
greatly influenced by the Clinton administration.30 The rationale was
that it would be better for businesses to regulate themselves than to
have government intervene.31 Although businesses would be
regulated by some laws, for the most part, businesses would decide
how to implement data protection. Indeed, state and federal
regulatory laws are only one component of the U.S. informational
privacy policy. Even so, they are important nevertheless, because
they define the scope and dictate the areas in which data privacy may
be enforced.
Currently, U.S. data privacy protection consists of a
hodgepodge of laws that were originally drafted for the government
and specific sectors of the economy. Most of these laws were not
created to apply to information gathered online, but over time they
have been used to regulate data privacy. Aside from legislation,
recent developments in case law are also beginning to shape data
protection.32 Unlike the EU model, where data privacy is a protected
right, U.S. data privacy law is founded on tort and contract
principles.33 Although these laws borrow from various legal areas

30

See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1–2 (1997), available at http://www.w3.org/
TR/NOTE-framework-970706.
31
Id.
32
See Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn.
2007); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv., Civ. No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); Bell v. Mich. Council, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 353
(Mich. App. Feb. 15, 2005).
33
See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Defining the Legal Standard for
Information Security, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 19, 22
(Anupham Chander, et al. eds., 2008) (noting that recent case law has upheld that
breach of the common law duty to provide security amounts to a tort); Jonathan K.
Sobel et al., The Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern, and the
Contract Law Dynamics Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET
AGE 55, 57–59 (Anupham Chander, et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that federal data
protection laws are based on contract principles).
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and apply to different sectors, it has been argued that these laws are
“amazingly consistent in [their] approach . . . . ”34 In his article,
Defining the Standard for Information Security, Thomas J.
Smedinghoff argues that laws concerning information security have
been consistent in defining the legal standard for data protection.35
Smedinghoff argues that each law has approached data protection
with the idea that “Security is a process, not a product.”36 Thus,
these laws do not rigidly dictate the requirements for “reasonable
security.”37 Rather, Smedinghoff identifies that data protection laws
have set a “process oriented” legal standard, meaning that they
“[focus] on a process to identify and implement measures that are
reasonable under the circumstances to achieve the desired security
objectives.”38 Indeed, when the federal laws are examined later in
this article, we will see an unmistakable pattern of assessment of risk,
identification of security measures, and verification of
implementation that is required by the “process oriented” standard.39
So, despite the fact that there are multiple areas and types of
information being regulated on both state and federal levels, it seems
that the laws do follow a consistent standard. Currently, there are a
slew of different federal laws. Some apply only to the government’s
collection and use of personal information, while others apply to
specific sectors of industry and still others apply to protect certain
portions of the population.
A. Data Privacy Laws at the Federal Level
At the federal level, laws that protect citizens against the
government’s use of personal information are the Privacy Act of
197440 and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).41 The Privacy
Act of 1974 states that any federal agency collecting personal
information for government records must: (1) collect only personal
34

See Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 23.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 23–24.
38
Id. at 24.
39
Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 24.
40
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(5) (2006).
41
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).

35
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information that is “relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose
of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive
order of the President”; (2) maintain the accuracy of the information,
and; (3) establish means of protecting the security of the
information.42
Similarly, FOIA makes the government responsible for
guarding the personal information found in federal agency records.43
Although FOIA is a law ensuring public access to governmental
records, the Act protects privacy by exempting the public from
obtaining personnel, medical, and law enforcement records.44
Although these statutes were designed to apply primarily to federal
records and government, they are not limited only to information
gathered in the real world; thus, they may be applied to information
gathered online as well.45
Congress has regulated businesses’ data collection and use by
enacting laws aimed at specific sectors of the market as well as
specific sections of the population.46 These laws have been passed
one at a time, and government regulation is beginning to expand to
cover just about every possible sector. Laws governing the business
sectors are: the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),47 the Cable
Communications Policy Act (CCPA),48 the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),49 the Children’s
Online Privacy Act,50 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),51 the

42

See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1), (5), (10).
See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
44
See id.
45
See id. § 552(a)(3)(C) (“[A]n agency shall make reasonable efforts to
search for the records in electronic form or format, except when such efforts would
significantly interfere with the operation of the agency's automated information
system.").
46
See Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 59.
47
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006).
48
47 U.S.C. §§ 521–554 (2006).
49
42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
50
15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).
51
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006).
43
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act,52 and the Federal Trade Commission Act,
section 5 (FTC Act).53
1. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Enacted in 1970,54 the FCRA was the first federal law
intended to regulate private businesses’ use of personal information,
especially where the consent of the individual has not been
obtained.55 This Act is especially important to the U.S. system of
data protection because it provides the basis for the country’s
modern-day privacy legislation of “notice–and–consent” and “access
to information.”56 The FCRA allows a credit agency to distribute a
credit report containing personal information in order to determine
the individual’s eligibility for credit, insurance, employment, and the
like, but the act requires the credit agency to take reasonable
measures to ensure the accuracy, relevancy, and proper use of the
information.57 The FCRA regulates traditional as well as online
credit reporting activities.58 Some have noted that the FCRA
approaches data privacy using a “pseudo-contractual” approach to
data protection by allowing customers to change the scope of their
relationship with credit reporting agencies.59
2. Cable Communications Policy Act
In 1984, Congress passed the CCPA,60 which requires cable
companies to provide their customers with annual notice as to how
their information is being used and the purpose for which it is being
used.61 The CCPA also requires cable companies to give their
52

Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 304 (2002).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
54
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, (FCRA) and the Privacy of Your Credit
Report, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/fcra/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
55
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x. See also Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 60.
56
Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 60.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 58.
60
Cable Communications Policy of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–554 (2006).
61
Id.
53
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customers the option to remove their name from any mailing list
before the list may be released to a third party.62
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HIPAA was passed in 1996, and like the data protection laws
before it, HIPAA requires medical providers, insurers, and other
entities handling health information to adopt a system for notice, optout-disclosures, and access to private information.63 The Act also
requires secure transmission of health data.64
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The GLBA, also known as the Financial Modernization Act
of 1999, adds onto the provisions of the FCRA. The GLBA requires
financial institutions to provide customers with notice of its
information sharing practices along with an opportunity to opt out of
certain disclosures of personal information to third parties.65 The
GLBA also prohibits financial institutions from disclosing account
numbers to unaffiliated third parties.66 Further, the Act not only puts
responsibility on companies, but also on the FTC by requiring that
the Commission formulate a Safeguards Rule that businesses must
follow.67
5. Federal Trade Commission Act Section
Lastly, section 5 of the FTC Act is also employed to ensure
data privacy. Although the Act, passed in 1938 and amended in
1994, has long been present in consumer protection jurisprudence, it
has only recently been applied to information security.68 Essentially,
section 5 is a catch-all that regulates the business sectors that have
62

Id.
Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 58.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
16 C.F.R. § 314 (2012).
68
Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 22. Section 5 was first applied to
information security in 2005. Id.
63
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not been covered by federal regulation. The FTC has asserted that
“failure to provide appropriate information security was itself, an
unfair trade practice . . . . ”69
Section 5 has been used to halt a number of practices
dangerous to information privacy. First, it can be used to protect
consumer data. In a complaint brought by the FTC against DSW,
Inc., the FTC charged the company with engaging in an unfair
practice when it allowed hackers to gain access to the credit card and
checking account numbers of over 1.4 million customers.70 The FTC
stated that DSW “failed to provide reasonable and appropriate
security for sensitive customer information.”71 DSW had stored
sensitive information in multiple files when it no longer needed such
information, failed to use “readily available security measures,” and
stored information in unencrypted files, among other things.72
Second, the FTC has also applied section 5 to “phishing.”73 In 2004,
the FTC brought a complaint against Zachary Hill for engaging in
phishing activities.74 Hill had sent fraudulent emails to AOL users
asking for users’ passwords and login names along with their bank
account numbers and Social Security numbers.75 Third, the FTC has
also applied section 5 to operations that secretly download spyware
onto a user’s computer. In a complaint brought against Seismic

69

Id.
DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 1,
2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/12/dsw.shtm.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Phishing is a form of identity theft. Con artists set up fake websites or
send fraudulent emails that gather a user’s personal information, such as passwords
and credit card information, once a user visits the website or opens the email. See
Phishing: Frequently Asked Questions, MICROSOFT SAFETY AND SECURITY
CENTER,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/online-privacy/phishing-faq.aspx
(click “What Is Phishing”) (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
74
See FTC, Justice Department Halt Identity Theft Scam, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
(Mar.
22,
2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/03/
phishinghilljoint.shtm. The Department of Justice eventually secured a 46-month
prison sentence against Hill. See FTC v. Hill, H 03-5537 (E.D. Va.), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323102/0323102zkhill.shtm (click on “Criminal
Information”).
75
FTC, Justice Department Halt Identity Theft Scam, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, supra note 74.
70
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Entertainment Productions, the FTC argued that Seismic engaged in
unfair acts and practices when they downloaded software without
notifying users.76 Seismic had downloaded spyware onto users’
computers which then compelled users to purchase “Spy Wiper” in
order to have the spyware programs deleted.77 The FTC noted that it
was an unfair act to “compel” users to purchase Spy Wiper by
compromising their computers.78 But the FTC also found the act of
installing the spyware, in the first place, as an unfair practice in and
of itself because it was done without the user’s knowledge or
permission.79
6. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
enacted in 1998, is unlike most data protection laws in that it was
aimed at protecting a specific section of the population rather than
regulating a specific market.80 COPPA was aimed at regulating the
collection of information of children under the age of thirteen.81
Indeed, it requires web operators to comply with notice requirements
and obtain parental permission before disclosing a child’s personal
information.82 Again, we see contract principles coming into play—
here, minors are not able to contract and thus parents must make the
decisions for them.

76

FTC Cracks Down on Spyware Operation, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/spyware.shtm.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See COPPA, Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, COPPA,
http://www.coppa.org/comply.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
81
Id.
82
COPPA poses a big problem to social networking websites such as
Facebook. See Emily Bazelon, Why Facebook Is After Your Kids, NEW YORK
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/magazine/whyfacebook-is-after-your-kids.html?_r=0.
This also raises the question of
enforcement of COPPA on such websites—who is to stop a 12 year old from
creating an account on Facebook?
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B. State Laws
In addition to federal laws, there are state laws that govern
privacy protection. Virtually all states have laws requiring a business
to notify a consumer when its security has been breached.83 Other
states have gone farther and have also enacted data destruction laws,
or laws requiring the destruction of data once the business no longer
wants to retain the information.84 In addition, some states also have
laws imposing a duty on a business to provide security for personal
information.85 State regulation in this area has been a relatively new
occurrence. When California passed its security breach notification
law in 2003, it was the first state to do so and the legislation was
considered a “landmark.”86 Since then, other states have followed
and are moving towards the trend of broadening data protection.87 It

83

Smedinghoff, supra note 33. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82
(2007) (“ Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that
owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, shall
disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or
notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident . . . . ”). Id. §
1798.82(a).
84
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (West 2012). States that have similar
laws are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See also Smedinghoff,
supra note 33, at 33.
85
These states include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah. Smedinghoff,
supra note 33, at 32.
86
See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 17b: How to Deal With a
Security Breach, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, (Feb. 2006),
https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs17b-SecurityBreach.htm. See also Alexander P.
Woollcott, California Significantly Expands Privacy Breach Notification Law,
MMM TECH LAW & BUSINESS REPORT, http://www.mmmtechlaw.com/2011/09/22/
california-significantly-expands-privacy-breach-notification-law/ (last visited Dec.
30, 2012).
87
See Woollcott, supra note 86. See also Massachusetts Privacy Law –
201
CMR
17
Compliance,
RAPID
7,
http://www.rapid7.com/solutions/compliance/mass-201-CMR-17.jsp (last visited
Dec. 30, 2012) (noting that Massachusetts’s new data privacy law has “set a new
level in state security laws . . . . ” The law was unlike the laws before it in that it
applied to private and public sector entities “regardless of where that entity is
located.”).
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is interesting to note that some of the laws incorporate federal laws.
For instance, California’s privacy breach notification law was
expanded in 2011 to provide that entities that are subject to HIPAA
will be considered as in compliance with the privacy breach
notification law if those entities have complied with breach
notifications under HIPAA.88 In addition, Massachusetts passed 201
CMR 17 in 2008, a law that incorporated the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act.89
C. Enforcement
The FTC and the Department of Commerce are assigned the
task of fulfilling the “regulating” part of the sectoral model. In
addition to its main task of investigating and reporting to Congress
foreign trade conditions and domestic business conduct, the FTC
regulates online privacy to the extent that it relates to business and
trade. Unfortunately, the FTC is limited in that it does not have the
independent power to enforce data protection and there must exist a
rule of law before it can do so.90 This means that the FTC cannot
prevent data collection and distribution unless the collector has
posted a privacy policy and then failed to act in accordance to that
policy.91
The Department of Commerce also plays a role in regulating
data protection and has several agencies that help it do so: the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), the International Trade Administration (ITA), the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Internet
Policy Task Force.92 It is important to note, however, that these
88

See Woollcott, supra note 86.
Massachusetts Privacy Law – 201 CMR 17 Compliance, RAPID 7, supra
note 87; JILL JUDD, MA 201 CMR 17 STANDARDS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.whipplehill.com/ftpimages/408/misc/misc_63679.pdf.
90
FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., PRIVACY ONLINE:
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE–A REPORT TO
CONGRESS iii, 4, (May 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
91
Id.
92
Internet Policy Task Force, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/internet-policytask-force (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
89
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agencies do not exclusively regulate data protection, and are not set
up exclusively for the purpose of regulating the Internet. Presently,
the NTIA serves as the President’s principal advisor on
communications and data policy.93 The NTIA is responsible for
working with other governments and international organizations to
form compatible Internet policies, but it also works with businesses
and other U.S. governmental agencies in order to develop new
policies.94
Unlike NTIA, the ITA’s scope is narrower and the portion of
Internet policy that it focuses on is related to the U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor Agreement.95 The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement was
formed in 2000 in order to facilitate the transfer of personal data
between the U.S. and the EU.96 Before the Safe Harbor Agreement,
the EU states could not transfer data to the U.S. because the U.S.’s
data protection policy was inadequate according to the standards of
the European Commission.97 The Safe Harbor Agreement created a
set of guidelines for data protection that allowed for transmission of
data between the U.S. and EU.98 The ITA is responsible for
managing the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement and must make sure
the U.S.’s data policy conforms to the agreement.99
On the other hand, NIST is in charge of federal data
protection on the Internet.100 NIST, along with the Department of
Defense and the Intelligence Community, produces Joint Task Force
93

Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Secretary, NTIA, Speech at Hearing
on Internet Privacy: The Views of the FTC, FCC, and NTIA (July 14, 2011),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2011/testimony-assistantsecretary-strickling-internet-privacy-views-ftc-fcc-and-nti [hereinafter Speech of
Strickling].
94
Internet Policy, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/internet-policy (last visited
Dec. 30, 2012).
95
Id.
96
U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2011).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Speech of Strickling, supra note 93.
100
National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Proposes New
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST TECH
BEAT (July 19, 2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/privacy-071911.cfm.
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Transformation Initiative Documents.101 NIST does not have a welldefined area of expertise in terms of data protection, and it appears
that it overlaps a great deal with other agencies.102 For instance, even
though there is an Internet Policy Task Force, the NIST has its own
Internet policy advisors.103
Lastly, the Internet Policy Task Force (“Task Force”) is a
newly formed agency whose purpose is to identify public policy and
operational challenges in the Internet environment.104 In 2010, the
Task Force released a paper proposing the creation of a data
protection agency.105 In the paper, the Task Force argued that a data
protection agency would be helpful because it would act as an
“authority to convene businesses and civil society to develop
effective, consensus-based voluntary codes of conduct in a wide
variety of commercial contexts.”106 This proposed office will be part
of the Department of Commerce.107 Although this proposal was met
with enthusiasm by those lauding the EU model of regulation, it is
clear that this proposed office is really nothing new.108 The agency
will be like the Task Force itself, and it will work to facilitate
communication between the private sector and the government in
order to build upon the existing sectoral model.
Although the sectoral model is meritorious because it affords
businesses freer rein in conducting its affairs and does not require the
government to “babysit,” so to speak, the sectoral model is far from
perfect. Among the criticisms of the sectoral model is the fact that it
is unwieldy and usually results in ineffective and spotty

101

Id.
William Jackson, NIST To Get New Lead Internet Policy Advisor, GCN
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://gcn.com/articles/2010/08/10/ari-schwartz-to-take-policyrole-at-nist.aspx.
103
Id.
104
Internet Policy, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 94.
105
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 19.
106
Id. at 44.
107
Id.
108
Peter Swire, Getting Online Privacy Policy Right, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(Jan.
28,
2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org//
issues/2011/01/privacy_office.html.
102
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enforcement.109 Precisely because a central authority is not involved
in oversight of businesses, guidelines set out by the FTC are not
followed across the board and, in addition, enforcement is difficult to
carry out without a centralized body.110 As to the self-regulatory
aspect of the sectoral model, it is clear that putting a business in
charge of protecting the rights of its consumers leads to a conflict of
interest.111
III. THE EU MODEL
In contrast to the U.S. model, the EU online data privacy
policy gives less freedom to businesses in conducting its business in
the online privacy front. In 1995, the European Union passed its
Directive on Data Protection,112 which among other things, provided
standards that member nations were required to follow. For instance,
member states were required to ensure that personal information is to
be “processed fairly and lawfully”113 and “kept in a form which
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is
necessary.”114
The Data Directive is incredibly protective of personal
information and regulates how the information is used, when it is
used, and how the notification of data collection should be given.115
Many have argued that the EU’s emphasis on informational privacy
stems from World War II and Germany’s horrific past. The
extensive government records that allowed Germany to single out its
109

Ryan Moshell, . . . And Then There was One: The Outlook For a SelfRegulatory United States Amidst A Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data
Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 367 (2005).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Council Directive 95/46, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
113
Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
114
Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
115
EU countries have a well-defined basis for online privacy rights. On
the other hand, U.S. law does not directly or specifically protect individual privacy.
The Constitution does not protect individual privacy rights. See Susan E. Gindin,
Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of Internet, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1185 (1997) (detailing the Constitution’s lack of privacy
protection for personal information and tracing Supreme Court decisions that have
upheld that the Constitution does not recognize privacy for personal information).
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Jewish citizens have led to a European concern for data privacy.116
Whatever the reason for Europe’s strong focus on privacy, it is clear
that the EU has a stronger policy than that of the U.S. and at the
foundation of this policy is the Data Directive.
The EU model of data protection is described as a
comprehensive model in which an entity is set up to ensure that
businesses and individuals are adhering to privacy protection laws.117
The Data Directive provides the broad framework of rules that
member states must then implement and add to in any way they
please. The Data Directive provides eight main principles: (1)
purpose limitation, (2) data quality, (3) data security, (4) special
protection for sensitive data, (5) transparency, (6) data transfers, (7)
independent oversight, and (8) individual redress.118 The principle of
purpose limitation requires that the information should only be
collected to the extent that it is necessary for a specific purpose and
that it is not stored any longer than is needed.119 Data quality
requires that information be updated.120 Data security requires that
reasonable measures be taken to provide secure data transmissions.121
Next, the special protection for sensitive data principle forbids
government from collecting information regarding the “racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs . . .
[or] concerning health or sex life.”122 The transparency principle
stands for the idea that the person on whom information is collected
should be notified of the fact.123 The Data Directive requires not
only that individuals be informed when information is collected
about them but also that the person be informed of the identity of the
collector and the purpose for which it will be used.124 Next, under
the data transfers principle, transfers of personal information to third
116

See Moshell, supra note 109, at 358. Indeed, a look at the Data
Directive’s prohibition on government’s collection of information regarding an
individual’s racial or ethnic background certainly seems to back this point.
117
Id. at 366.
118
Cates, supra note 21, at 173, 185–86.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Data Directive, supra note 22, art. 8(1).
123
See Cates, supra note 21, at 186.
124
Id.
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parties are prohibited if done without consent of the data subject.125
Also, under the independent oversight principle, an oversight body
that will audit data processing systems and investigate complaints
must be set up.126 Lastly, the individual redress principle requires
that individuals be provided with the right to access their personal
information and enforce legal rights against those who wrongfully
use their personal information.127 In addition to these eight
principles, the Directive also requires that EU members only
exchange data with non-EU countries only if the non-EU country has
an “adequate” data protection policy.128
In order to enforce the principles of the Directive, in 2000 the
EU created a supervisory authority to oversee the EU community in
regards to data policy protection.129 This supervisory authority is
called the European Data-Protection Supervisor and works
independently from the European Parliament and Commission,
meaning that it does not take orders from either.130 The Supervisor’s
more specific duties include investigation of complaints and
providing information to the EU community in general.131 The
Supervisor may exert power in the instance where “data processing is
carried out in the EU and the data controller is established there.”132
The Supervisor may also exert power when the data controller is not
based in the EU but in a place “where its national law applies by
125

Id.
Id.
127
Id.
128
See Data Directive, supra note 22, art. 3. This rule has been quite
problematic for those countries wishing to obtain EU membership as well as those
countries wishing to trade with EU nations. See also Eric Shapiro, All is Not Fair
in the Privacy Trade: The Safe Harbor Agreement and the World Trade
Organization, 71 FORDHAM L. REV 2781 (2003) (explaining how prospective EU
members must conform to the EU’s data policy in order to become a member).
129
Authority for the EU Data Protection Supervisor was created in
Regulation 45/2001. Council Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, ch.1, art. 1(2), 2000 O.J. (L 8).
130
Id. at art. 44(1), (2).
131
Id. at art. 46.
132
Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor: European Data Protection
Law and Electronic Commerce, 35 INT’L LAW. 79, 82 (2001).
126
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virtue of public international law.” 133 Lastly, the Supervisor may
also exert power when the “data controller is established outside the
EU but equipment is used in the EU for the purposes of processing
data.”134
Now that we’ve examined the legal basis for the EU privacy
regime, it is also necessary to analyze the implementation of the
Directive. EU member states are given the freedom to implement the
Directive in the way that each chooses, and each state has a unique
way of carrying out the EU law. It is especially interesting to see the
varying levels of power that each state has given its government in
order to regulate data privacy. The policy question of how much
power should be given to government to protect privacy shows how
each country has managed to balance the competing interests of
fundamental rights and state power. In addition, this topic is also
important because the question lies at the very core of the U.S. data
protection model. The different approaches that EU states have
chosen will help determine whether a policy similar to the EU policy
will be feasible in the U.S.
Two EU countries that best illustrate diverging approaches in
the level of power it accords to government in regulating privacy are
the U.K. and France. The U.K. has generally been careful about
burdening companies and stepping too much on the toes of
businesses in the process of protecting privacy. In addition, it has not
enacted any overreaching laws that have interfered with existing
rights. On the other hand, France has come under fire more than
once for what some perceive as over-inclusive laws that infringe
upon the liberties of its people.
A. The United Kingdom
In the U.K., the government body overseeing online privacy
enforcement is called the Informational Commissioner’s Office
(ICO). The ICO was formed with the goals of transparency of
businesses and information collectors and privacy of personal
information. The ICO is a relatively young organization that has

133
134

Id.
Id.
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developed a great deal since its humble start.135 In its early days, the
ICO consisted of only 80 people working in a single office.136
Today, it has 4 offices with a total staff count of 353 and receives a
little over 30,500 complaints a year.137 Its goals are to promote
transparency and data privacy for personal information.138
The ICO was created in 1984 and was originally titled the
Data Protection Registrar until 2000 when it was given its current
name.139 It is tasked with enforcing the Data Protection Act of 1998,
the Data Protection Telecommunications Directive (97/66/EC), the
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, and the
Environmental Communications Regulations 2003, and the Freedom
of Information Act.140 In addition, this body is also responsible for
ensuring that the U.K. complies with EU rules.141 Further, the ICO
has a public record of all data controllers and requires all data
controllers to register.142 Although it is a government body, the ICO
is given much relative freedom in that it is an independent regulatory
agency that reports to Parliament.143
In order to enforce the data privacy policies for which it is
responsible, the ICO has a number of means available to it. However
the options it can exercise depend on whether the issue at hand
concerns data privacy or transparency. In order to promote data
privacy, the ICO has eight options on which it may proceed: (1) serve
135

A large part of this growth should be credited to the Internet boom.
Information Commissioner’s Office, History of the ICO, ICO,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation/history.aspx (last visited Dec.
30, 2012). It is interesting to note that in its second year, the ICO only received
eleven complaints throughout that year. Id. However, it is important to keep in
mind that this was before the Internet became widely accessible.
137
Information Commissioner’s Office, Key Facts, ICO,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation/key_facts.aspx (last visited Dec.
30, 2012).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Information Commissioner’s Office, Introduction to the ICO, ICO,
available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation /introduction.aspx
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Information Commissioner’s Office, History of the ICO, supra note
136.
136
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notices, (2) issue undertakings, (3) serve enforcement notices, (4)
conduct assessments, (5) serve assessment notices, (6) issue fine
notices, (7) prosecute wrongdoer, and (8) report to Parliament on
pervasive issues.144 When the ICO chooses to serve notices, it will
give notice that an organization must turn over particular information
to the ICO within a specified period of time.145 When the ICO issues
undertakings, on the other hand, it will require that an organization
take a specific course of action in order to adhere faithfully to the
rules.146 Next, enforcement notices are commonly used when there
has been noncompliance and these notices require that an
organization take steps in order to comply with the law.147 Then,
there are assessments or audits in order to ensure compliance.148 The
serving of assessment notices is used to assess whether an
organization is collecting personal data accordingly; this option is
used for data protection only.149 Next, fines of up to £500,000 may
be issued for “serious” breaches of the Data Protection Act or the
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations.150 Then, of
course, there is always the option to prosecute those who engage in

144

Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data Protection
and Privacy and Electronic Communications, ICO, http://www.ico.gov.uk/
what_we_cover/taking_action/dp_pecr.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data
Protection and Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 144.
150
Id. The ICO wasn’t given the power to fine organizations until 2008.
See Stuart Sumner, Analysis: Should the ICO Wield the Carrot or the Stick?,
COMPUTING.CO.UK (Aug. 4, 2001), http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/analysis/
2099482/analysis-ico-wield-carrot-stick. Interestingly, Commissioner Graham has
asked for the power to issue custodial sentencing for breaches under the Data
Protection Act. Id.
The ICO’s largest fine to date (£130,000) has been issued to Powys
County Council for sending information about a child protection case to the wrong
recipients. See Dan Raywood, Largest ICO Fine Issued To Powys County Council
for Two Breaches of Sensitive Data, SC MAGAZINE UK (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/largest-ico-fine-issued-to-powys-county-councilfor-two-breaches-of-sensitive-data/article/218221/.
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criminal acts under the Data Protection Act.151 Prosecutions usually
involve fines and a conditional discharge,152 which means that the
wrongdoer will not receive a punishment if they comply with certain
rules for a period of time. Lastly, the ICO may report to Parliament
in order to address data privacy issues.153
The methods that the ICO may use to promote transparency
are not unlike those available to counter act data privacy issues, but
there are some still minor differences. Just as with data privacy
issues, the ICO may still tackle transparency issues by conducting
assessments, serving information notices, issuing undertakings,
prosecuting wrongdoers, and reporting to Parliament.154 However,
unlike with a data privacy issues, the ICO may issue practice
recommendations and decision notices.155 Practice recommendations
are used to map out steps a public organization should take to uphold
the codes. In the same vein, decision notices report the results of the
ICO’s investigation to “publically highlight particular issues with an
authority’s handling of a specific request.”156

151

Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data Protection
and Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 144.
152
Id. In addition to fines and conditional discharge, the ICO is also
calling for “more effective deterrent sentences, including the threat of prison, to be
available to the courts to stop the unlawful use of personal information.” See
Information Commissioner’s Office, Receptionist Unlawfully Accessed Sister-inLaw’s Medical Details, ICO (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.ico.gov.uk/news/
latest_news/2011/receptionist-unlawfully-accessed-sister-in-law-medical-details16122011.aspx.
153
Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Data Protection
and Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 144.
154
See id.; Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Freedom
of Information, Environmental Information and Spatial or Geographic
Information,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/taking_action/foi_eir.aspx
(last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
155
Information Commissioner’s Office, Taking Action: Freedom of
Information, Environmental Information and Spatial or Geographic Information,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/taking_action/foi_eir.aspx (last visited Oct.
25, 2012). In addition, the ICO may not issue assessment notices, which can only
be used for privacy issues. But it seems that this would not make much of a
difference because an enforcement notice essentially serves the same purpose as an
assessment notice. Id.
156
Id.
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Despite the various means through which for the ICO can
enforce the Data Protection Act, some still perceive it as toothless
and inept.157 This perception of ineptness has recently been furthered
by the Leveson Inquiry.158 During the Leveson Inquiry, Francis
Aldhouse, a former head of the ICO, stated that media groups were
“too big” for the ICO to confront despite the fact that the public body
had clear evidence showing that journalists were engaging in phone
hacking to obtain stories.159 Although it is conceded that the ICO
was not the only group afraid to step up to the powerful media
conglomerates, the Leveson Inquiry was a blow to the ICO’s
reputation nonetheless.160 Testimony about the ICO during the
Leveson Inquiry and its subsequent criticism offers a telling portrait
of how citizens feel about the organization. The Leveson Inquiry
tackles a universally condemned breach of privacy, and it is

157
See The Frontline, ICO’S Reputation Takes a Hit After Leveson
Testimony by Former Deputy, V3.CO.UK (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.v3.co.uk/v3uk/the-frontline-blog/2129362/icos-reputation-takes-hit-leveson-testimony-deputy
(“The [ICO] has never had an easy existence, many criticising it as a toothless
watchdog before it had the power to fine organisations, and then complaining that it
has failed to use this power correctly since it was introduced.”).
158
The Leveson Inquiry is an investigation into journalism practices
sparked by the News of the World phone hacking debacle. See Background, The
LEVESON
INQUIRY,
available
at
Leveson
Inquiry,
THE
http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
159
Leveson Inquiry: Watchdog Chief Francis Aldhouse ‘refused to go
after papers’ Despite Steve Whittamore Hacking Evidence, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec.
1, 2011, 7:21 AM), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/levesoninquiry/8927424/Leveson-Inquiry-watchdog-chief-Francis-Aldhouse-refused-togo-after-papers-despite-Steve-Whittamore-hacking-evidence.html.
160
See The Frontline, ICO’S Reputation Takes a Hit After Leveson
Testimony by Former Deputy, supra note 157 (“However, while it's easy to find
fault with the ICO, the organisation was clearly one of countless groups, businesses
and individuals that dared not incur the wrath of the Murdoch media empire, even
if they were operating on behalf of the government.”).
Testimony during the Leveson Inquiry revealed that many others knew
about journalists hacking into phones. See Nick Davies, Murdoch Papers Paid
£1m to Gag Phone-Hacking Victims, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2009, 5:33 PM),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/jul/08/murdoch-papers-phonehacking. Despite this fact, however, the ICO’s inaction in the face of glaring
evidence appears especially egregious because the ICO is supposed to be an
independent watchdog for UK citizens and, unlike other groups, had less of an
interest at stake in confronting this unethical journalistic practice.
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understandable that many would be angry at the ICO’s inaction
because of the emotionally polarizing subject matter. However, the
overall sense of dissatisfaction towards the ICO reflects the
consensus of many citizens that the group is incompetent.161 The
ICO’s own monitoring reports evidence slow progress in bringing
organizations and businesses up to speed with the Data Protection
Act.162 Even though a survey in late 2011 showed an improvement
from past years, citizens are still dissatisfied with the ICO.163 The
recent survey showed that nearly three-quarters of firms were aware
that they needed to protect personal information, which was a 26%
improvement from the previous year’s survey.164 However, it is
unclear whether firms are actually complying with the Data
Protection Act.165 In addition, three-fourths of citizens surveyed felt
that online businesses were not adequately protecting their data.166
What’s more, many U.K. citizens are unaware of the
existence of the ICO.167 According to a survey of 2,000 people
conducted by OnePoll for the security company, LogRhythm, sixtyfour percent of those polled did not know about the ICO, and of those
that were aware of the ICO, only thirty-three percent believed that the
161

See Stuart Sumner, Analysis: Should the ICO Wield the Carrot or the
Stick?, COMPUTING.CO.UK (Aug. 4, 2001), http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/
analysis/2099482/analysis-ico-wield-carrot-stick.
162
See Information Commissioner’s Office, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT PUBLICATION SCHEMES POLICE SECTOR MONITORING REPORT (March 2010),
available
at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/~/
media/documents/library/Freedom_of_Information/Research_and_reports/POLICE
_SECTOR_PS_MONITORING_REPORT.ashx (last visited Dec. 30, 2012); See
also Simon Quicke, ICO Reveals Patchy Progress From Firms Over Data
Protection,
MICROSCOPE.CO.UK
(Oct.
21,
2011),
http://www.microscope.co.uk/news/reseller-news/ico-reveals-patchy-progressfrom-firms-over-data-protection/.
163
See Quicke, supra note 162.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. This distrust is, in large part, a reaction to various news reports of
businesses losing client information and police using information to snoop into
citizens’ personal lives. Id.
167
LogRhythm, Research Shows UK Public Losing Patience with
Organisations that Endanger Customer Data, LOGRHYTHM.COM (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://logrhythm.com/company/press-releases/research-shows-uk-public-losingpatience.aspx.
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group was adequately fulfilling its duties.168
Perhaps the
dissatisfaction stems from how the ICO enforces the law. The ICO
has only recently been given the power to fine organizations and this
power has worked to put some teeth into the once toothless data
privacy group.169 But now that the ICO has a stick with which to
enforce the law, the question becomes whether or not the ICO should
work directly with companies and organizations in order to guide
them towards a data protection plan or whether fines should be
issued.170 For some organizations that already have their budgets
spread thin a fine would be devastating.171 However, the other side
of the coin reveals that such organizations will be unlikely to risk
another fine or a fine at all, and the threat of a fine would encourage
businesses and organizations to be more careful about complying
with the rules.172 Lastly, the ICO is criticized for primarily targeting
breaches made by the public sector.173
B. France
In France, the data protection authority is known as the
Commission on Information Technology and Liberties (CNIL).174
The word “information” in CNIL is incredibly broad and is defined
to cover the “organization, processing, and transmission of personal
information, normally by computers, but it also includes a concern
for the implications of information systems for society.”175 CNIL
was created by the January 6, 1978 Act and was intended to protect
168

Id. LogRhythm is a company that provides products used for cyber
security.
See
About
LogRhythm,
LOGRHYTHM.COM,
http://www.logrhythm.com/Company/Overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
169
See Sumner, supra note 161.
170
Id. Some believe that “[t]raining and education is the best way to
prevent data breaches . . . .” Id.
171
See id.
172
See id.
173
Peter Judge, ICO Slaps Oldham School, But Suffers Fresh Criticism,
TECHWEEK EUROPE (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/icoslaps-oldham-school-but-suffers-fresh-criticism-27241.
174
See Its Status, CNIL, http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/status/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012).
175
DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETIES 176 (1989).

Fall 2012

U.S. and EU Data Protection Policies

839

the privacy and individual rights of French citizens in the face of
technological changes.176 Like the U.K.’s ICO, CNIL is an
independent agency.177 Unlike the ICO, however, CNIL is more
seamlessly integrated into its country’s government.178 While the
ICO consists of members independent of Parliament, CNIL consists
of several members who hold actual positions within the branches of
government.179 For instance, among the members of CNIL are four
members of Parliament, two members of the Economic and Social
Council, and six Supreme Court judges.180 The five other members
of CNIL do not hold seats in government.181 Most recently, the
French Data Protection Act was amended by a new law.182 The new
law provides for a new position within CNIL’s plenary committee
known as Defender of Rights.183
Four departments assist CNIL commissioners with their tasks:
(1) Legal & International Affairs and Expert Appraisals; (2) Users
Relations and Inspections; (3) Design, Innovation, & Expertise; and
(4) Human Resources, Finance, IT, & Logistics.184 CNIL’s tasks
consist of reviewing bills submitted to it by the government, issuing
sanctions or warnings to noncompliant companies, conducting

176

Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Its Status,
available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/status/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2012). The catalyst to the creation of CNIL was the government’s SAFARI project
which involved assigning numbers to each citizen in order to streamline records.
Id. The public heavily criticized SAFARI, and feared total invasion of personal
privacy. Id. So CNIL was formed to counteract these fears. Id.
177
Id.
178
This arm’s length relationship with the government further complicates
CNIL’s independence, or lack thereof. FLAHERTY, supra note 175, at 185.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
See Hunton & Williams, LLP, French Data Protection Act Amended,
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY LAW BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2011/03/articles/french-data-protection-actamended/.
183
Id.
184
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Its Operation,
CNIL.FR, available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/its-operation/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2012).
CNIL.FR,
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investigations, and informing the public of its rights and
obligations.185
CNIL has the power to regulate, inspect, sanction, and keep
inventory of existing processing operations.186 Under CNIL’s
regulatory power, companies or entities wishing to implement a
public file must first receive an affirmative ruling from the body.187
Under its investigatory power, CNIL has the right to investigate
complaints and to monitor the security of data processing.188 In
addition, according to the August 6, 2004 Act, CNIL may either
impose sanctions of up to €300,000 or it may issue warnings,
depending on the type of breach.189
CNIL has been criticized for its lack of independence from
the government. Critics have claimed that CNIL has leaned towards
supporting the government rather than remaining faithful to its
original purpose of protecting data privacy and citizens’ rights.190 As
mentioned earlier, CNIL was created in response to criticism of the
government program SAFARI, which was a project creating a
database documenting each citizen.191 It appears that CNIL was
originally created to protect French citizens from government
intrusions to privacy. In this respect, citizens regard CNIL as
abandoning its duties.192
Recently, the French government passed a law named
LOPPSI 2 that allows blocking Internet access without a court order
to sites containing child pornography.193 Although those opposed to
185

Id.
Missions and Powers, CNIL, http://www.cnil.fr/english/thecnil/operation/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, supra note
184.
190
Chloe Leprince, Cnil: trente ans contre la << tyrannie de l’ordinateur
>> [CNIL: Thirty Years Against the “‘Tyranny of the Computer’”], RUE 89 (Jan.
6, 2008), http://www.rue89.com/2008/01/06/cnil-trente-ans-contre-la-tyrannie-delordinateur.
191
See supra note 176.
192
See supra notes 161–166 and accompanying text.
193
France: Loppsi 2 Adopted-Internet Filtering Without Court Order,
EDRI (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.4/web-blockingadopted-france-loppsi-2.
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the law challenged it in the Constitutional Council, the law was
declared to be valid under the French Constitution.194 This law was
heavily criticized by French citizens who saw it as censorship of the
Internet.195 Although the CNIL voiced its reservations in preliminary
drafts of LOPPSI 2, French citizens felt that this was not enough.196
Indeed, it was even more shocking to French citizens that the
president of CNIL, Alex Tüurk, ended up voting for LOPPSI 2.197
Despite these critiques, CNIL does appear to be dogged in its
protection of privacy. In 2011 it fined Google €100,000 for
collecting passwords, email messages, and login names while taking
pictures for Street View.198
IV. COMPARISON OF THE EU AND U.S. MODELS
In comparing the U.S. and EU models, one can see many
differences and some similarities at both the legislative and
enforcement levels. At the legislative level, the EU regime appears
more streamlined and less complex than its U.S. counterpart. For
example, the EU relies on only one law to provide the right to
informational privacy for citizens of EU states. In contrast, instead
of relying on one law to grant privacy protection, the U.S. relies on a
multitude of laws, such as the GLBA and HIPAA, to secure privacy.
Because the U.S. model relies on narrowly tailored laws to carve out
privacy rights, data protection in the U.S. depends upon various
factors, such as the type of information in question and the type of
business in question. Thus, U.S. citizens are is not given the right to
privacy of any and all personal information; rather, the right to
194

Loppsi 2 Bill Passes the French Constitutional Council Test, EDRI
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.6/loppsi-2-adopted.
195
See Leprince, supra note 190.
196
Christophe Auffray, Loppsi 2: la CNIL émet toujours des réserves
[Loppsi 2: the CNIL Still has its Reservations], ZDNET.FR (June. 23, 2011),
http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/loppsi-2-la-cnil-emet-toujours-des-reserves39752653.htm.
197
Juliean L., Le président de la CNIL justifie son vote des Loppsi et
Hadopi [The President of the CNIL Justifies His Vote and Loppsi and Hadopi],
NUMERAMA (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.numerama.com/magazine/17999-lepresident-de-la-cnil-justifie-son-vote-des-loppsi-et-hadopi.html.
198
France Fines Google Over Street View Data Blunder, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12809076.
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privacy depends on the type of information and whether or not the
sector of industry controlling the data is subject to regulation. On the
other hand, EU informational privacy is not bound by such factors
because the Directive grants a broad right to privacy across the board,
regardless of the type of business or information involved.
Interestingly enough, however, when the eight principles of
the Directive are compared to the multiple U.S. laws, we can see that
a number of U.S. laws strive to accomplish the same goals as the
Directive. It must be noted, however, that because of the way it is set
up, the goals of the U.S. system really depends on the laws in place
and each law varies one from the next. Recall that the eight goals of
the EU law are: (1) purpose limitation, (2) data quality, (3) data
security, (4) special protection, (5) transparency, (6) data transfers,
(7) independent oversight, and (8) individual redress.199 The
Directive goals that many U.S. laws target are: data quality, data
security, transparency, data transfers, and individual redress. The
fact that the U.S. framework allows users to update or correct
information to achieve the end-goal of data quality is not surprising
because it is in the best interests of businesses to do so—just look at
your Google or Amazon account, it will most likely allow you to
change or add to your address and credit card information. However,
there are laws that also strive to protect the best interests of citizens,
including HIPAA and FCRA.
Next, the U.S. model also shares the goal of data security in
that it requires businesses to take reasonable measures to provide data
security. In addition, the U.S. model also encourages transparency
by requiring companies to give notice. The most notable laws
providing for notice are GLBA, HIPAA, FCRA, COPPA, and, on the
state level, California’s security reporting statute, California Civil
Code § 1798.82. Unlike the business-driven aim of data quality, the
goal of transparency seems to be driven by legislatures more than
industry practice.
Next, the U.S. model also shares with the Directive the goal
of protecting data transfers. This goal, however, is closely
intertwined with the aim for transparency, and the U.S. uses the same
transparency mechanisms of notice and opt-out to protect data
transfers. Lastly, the U.S. also provides its citizens with the option

199

See supra discussion at 830–31.
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for individual redress. An individual may sue businesses under some
federal statutes and state laws if her personal information is
mishandled. In the end, the EU Directive and U.S. models do share a
great deal of similarities on the theoretical level.
In application, however, the differences that do exist between
the two models inevitably lead to differences on the enforcement
level also. The EU model’s reliance on solely the Directive to grant
privacy protection and the broad rights that the Directive provides,
results in a fairly straightforward and predictable application. In
contrast, the fact that the U.S. model rests on various laws, which are
further derived from different sources—contracts, tort, state, and
federal—adds to the complexity of its policy. This complexity in the
U.S. policy yields unpredictability and confusion for both industry
and citizens. For instance, different laws create different legal
standards. Under contract principles, a company may be required to
provide notice, choice, and access to any transfer of personal
information. Under tort law, if negligence is invoked, a company
would need to be held to the same duty of care as that practiced by
others in the same industry. In addition, there may be standards
imposed by federal and state law. The various possible standards
make it difficult for a company to determine its level of
responsibility. In the same vein, it also creates unpredictability for a
potential plaintiff seeking redress. Some have noted that class action
suits relying on contract claims have been more successful than those
relying on federal statutes, which are usually inapplicable.200
Comparison of the EU and U.S. models reveals some
similarities but also vast differences. One difference that makes the
U.S. model weaker in comparison to the EU model is the patchwork
of laws the former employs. These laws create a complex and often
confusing system that frustrates both businesses and private citizens
alike. On the other hand, the EU model has only one source that
provides the right to data protection, which makes for a more
straightforward, simple system. Despite these differences, however,
the U.S. and the EU do share similar policy goals. So, it is not the
U.S. laws themselves that need reworking because it is the

200

See Sobel et al., supra note 33, at 61 (noting that federal statutes
sometimes did not provide for the more common types of data misuse).
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application of the laws that create the differences between the EU
and U.S. models.
V. AN EXACT DUPLICATION OF THE EU MODEL WILL NOT WORK IN
THE U.S.
There is undoubtedly a need for a stronger data protection
regime in the U.S., but an exact duplication of the EU model is not
the answer. If the U.S. were to adopt the EU model, it would first
have to pass something identical to the Directive because the
Directive is the legal foundation for the EU’s data protection policy
and the very heart of the EU model. As mentioned before, the
Directive essentially guarantees citizens a right to informational
privacy. One glaring problem that the U.S. would have if it were to
pass a Directive-like law would be the validity of the law. Even
though the right to privacy has been recognized in the U.S., case law
shows that this right is not limitless and is subject to a number of
qualifications.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide a right
to privacy, the Supreme Court has read this right into the document.
The most notable Supreme Court cases establishing this right are
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade. In Griswold, the Court
had to decide on the constitutionality of several Connecticut statutes
that forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples.201
Expanding upon its previous rulings upholding personal autonomy,
the Court held that the Constitution also guaranteed generally, the
right to keep private matters from disclosure and, specifically, the
right of marital privacy.202 Despite the fact that the Constitution
201

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
Id. at 486. The Court had previously upheld personal autonomy in a
variety of cases. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking
down a statute that allowed for sterilization of criminals, stating that procreation is
“one of the basic civil rights of man”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925) (Court struck down an Oregon statute requiring children to attend
public schools, stating “the [statute] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923) (Court struck down a Nebraska
law prohibiting foreign languages from being taught to schoolchildren under the
reasoning that parents had a right to determine what their children should learn, and
teachers had a right to teach the subjects of their choosing.).
202
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itself does not mention privacy, it was a legitimate right nonetheless
because “[v]arious [constitutional] guarantees create zones of
privacy.”203 Griswold is important not only because it cemented the
right of privacy, but also because it defined privacy. Here, privacy
was defined as the right of protecting private matters from disclosure
and intrusion by the State.204
Eight years after Griswold, the Court decided the case of Roe
v. Wade and expanded its definition of privacy to include personal
autonomy.205 This controversial case dealt with a set of Texas
statutes that criminalized abortion.206 Citing to a string of cases that
had upheld the right to privacy, the Court concluded that such a right
included a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.207
However, the Court noted that this privacy right of personal
autonomy “cannot be said to be absolute” and that there are situations
in which a state may properly intervene in areas protected by the
right.208
From Griswold and Roe v. Wade, we get two definitions of
privacy—personal autonomy and freedom from intrusion and
disclosure. It is interesting to note that these seminal privacy cases
involved governmental and not a private third-party intrusion on
privacy. So whether or not privacy rights can be enforced against
private third parties is a question that the Court has left unanswered.
In addition, informational privacy is not like any other privacy right
that the Court has come across, and it is unclear whether the Court
would be willing to expand its definition of “privacy” to include
informational privacy. In Whalen v. Roe, for instance, the Court
allowed the state of New York to maintain a database containing
names of those who have acquired prescription drugs known to be
sold on the illegal market.209 The Court stated that it was possible
that the Constitution provided for informational privacy, but it

203
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 632 (13th ed.,

2009).
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 117–18.
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Id. at 152–53.
208
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Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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declined to decide on the matter.210 As such, the Court appears wary
of addressing this issue, and when the opportunity to decide on the
matter came up once more in the case of NASA v. Nelson, the Court
dodged the issue.211
Even assuming that the Court will incorporate informational
privacy into the current privacy right, the constitutional issue will
still be further complicated because the protections to privacy that
citizens have against the government are weak. If the privacy
protection is not ironclad even as against the government, and this
right is constitutionally protected, we can assume that the protection
of privacy that citizens have against private parties (something that
is not constitutionally protected) will be even weaker. Indeed, the
U.S. legal framework carefully protects the free flow of information,
and a wholesale adoption of the restrictive EU model would act as a
major roadblock to this important tenet of American jurisprudence.
As discussed previously, the EU model affects the collection, use,
and distribution of personal data.212 At the very core of the
American system of democracy is freedom of information. It is
something that we take pride in because we feel that it sets us apart
from countries that oppress and censor their citizens. The EU model
gives citizens a lot of control over their personal information. Thus,
if the U.S. adopts this model, it would conflict with decades of case
law allowing for dissemination of information and free flow of
information.213
Moreover, an exact replica of the EU model for the U.S. will
not work because the U.S. already has a model in place, and that
model is completely opposite to that of the EU model.214 It would
follow then, that if the U.S. adopted the EU model, the adoption
210

Id.
NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (2011), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf.
212
Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 20, at 148.
213
See TIME, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (holding that the Times
standard privilege precluded recovery under a New York statute that allowed for
recovery when a publication contained factual inaccuracies in matters of public
interest); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Haynes v. Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229, 1234–35 (7th Cir. 1993) (Seventh Circuit ruled that
a book depicting details of the Haynes’s relationship, including the husband’s
alcoholism, did not invade their privacy).
214
See discussion, supra 815.
211

Fall 2012

U.S. and EU Data Protection Policies

847

would have the effect of razing the current system in favor of a
completely different system. Practically speaking, it would be
impossible to uproot the system and start anew from the ground up.
VI. TAKING THE MIDDLE ROAD
Even though a wholesale adoption of the EU model would not
work in the U.S., that doesn’t mean that the U.S. shouldn’t borrow
from the EU model. The U.S. doesn’t have to pass sweeping laws or
take extreme measures in order to improve its data protection model;
rather, it can implement smaller measures. The goal should be to
find a plan that works within the U.S. form of government—one that
is compatible with its existing laws, political history, and culture. To
this end, the U.S. would benefit from borrowing some ideas from the
EU model, but should still keep the main framework on which the
existing model is built.
At present, the U.S. has a data privacy model that works
within its constitutional structure. This model combines a variety of
federal and state laws based on tort and contract principles with a
process-oriented approach.215 Because these laws aren’t grounded in
constitutional rights, they provide a legitimate basis for data
protection. In other words, these laws will not fall if they are
attacked on constitutional grounds. However, this is not to say that
the data policy is perfect. Although it is true that grounding the data
protection laws on torts and contract principles works within the U.S.
system, the laws are still disjointed. The current privacy protection
policy we have does not adequately protect data from getting into the
wrong hands.
A. Stronger Enforcement of Data Protection Laws
As recent developments in current events show, the U.S.
system at present is not equipped to handle breaches of privacy, and
215
See Smedinghoff, supra note 33, at 24 (noting that the FTC, states, and
industry sectors are moving towards a trend that approaches data privacy using the
“process oriented” legal standard in which an organization will “engage in an
ongoing and repetitive process that assesses risk, identifies and implements
responsive security measures, [and] verifies that they are effectively
implemented.”).
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there is still more that should be done. For instance, some companies
storing clients’ credit card information don’t encrypt their files,
which is a very basic step that one takes to protect sensitive
information. One could make the argument that the U.S. system
places too much faith in the market, and allowing companies to selfregulate data protection naturally leads to the problem of conflict of
interest. On one hand, businesses are delegated the duty of
protecting customer information. On the other hand, businesses need
to make a profit, and selling information is very lucrative.216 Even if
a company is not selling information, it lacks incentives to take that
extra step to provide a sufficient level of data protection. The U.S.
model, as it is now, is not practical and doesn’t work. As Professor
A. Michael Froomkin of the University of Miami Law School notes
in his article “The Death of Privacy?,” the “regulation” part of “selfregulation” is more-often-than-not overlooked.217 He states that the
existing plan is unworkable: “It may be that competitive pressures
might ultimately drive firms to seek privacy certification, but
currently fewer than 1000 firms participate in either TRUSTe's or
BBBOnline's programs, which suggests that market pressure to
participate is weak to nonexistent.”218 Businesses are responsible
only to themselves, and without an outside force driving change, it is
difficult to bring about any sort of data protection. Froomkin further
adds that because the U.S. endorses self-regulation “without legal
sanctions to incentivize it or enforce it; it is hard to believe that the
strategy is anything more than a political device to avoid
regulation.”219
It seems then that the problem with the U.S. model is not that
the data protection laws are flawed; rather, it is the enforcement of
the laws that is lacking. It’s not that there is an absence of federal
laws or state laws protecting data protection, it is non-compliance to

216

David Goldman, Your Phone Company Is Selling Your Personal Data,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 1, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/01/technology/
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these laws that is weakening the U.S. model.220 This begs the
politically charged question of: “Should the government play a
stronger role in enforcing these laws?” This question should be
answered in the affirmative. One of the most important things we
should borrow from the EU model is the idea of government
involvement in data regulation. Some government involvement is
needed to provide the data protection that is vital in today’s
technology-laden society. This is not a call for total government
control of data protection regulation, nor is it an argument that we
must have the same level of government involvement as the one the
EU model has. In other words, it is not suggested that the U.S.
should enact laws or encourage laws that allow for filtering of the
web, like LOPPSI 2. This paper only argues that government should
play a stronger role than the one it has now. There should be enough
federal regulation to encourage businesses to provide sufficient data
security, but not so much regulation that businesses are unnecessarily
burdened. Businesses should still maintain a role in data protection
in the sense that the government should work with businesses and
listen to feedback.
It could be argued that more government involvement would
pose a burden to businesses and corporations.
Admittedly,
businesses should have the freedom to make their own decisions and
act in any way that would best serve their shareholders. However,
they still owe a duty to their consumers to take reasonable data
security measures. More government enforcement would not mean
that the government would step in to control the decisions companies
make, it would only mean that companies would have to start
complying with existing law. In addition, if the U.S. adopted
stronger government enforcement without changing or adding any
new privacy protection laws, the obligation placed on businesses
would not be that much different than the obligation they now have.
Lastly, one could suggest that we could divide responsibility
of rule enforcement between the government and the people. The
people could help enforce the various laws in place through their
right of redress. This wouldn’t reflect the system that we have now
because the U.S. is a highly litigious society with a legal system set
up in a manner that encourages litigation. The right for a person to
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have her “day in court” is important. Class action litigation can pose
an effective measure for preventing lax data security by companies.
Although this measure may be less costly than increased government
involvement, it may not be very effective. At present, there are
several statutes under which a private citizen may sue, including
HIPAA and GLBA.221 In addition, most of the actions that the FTC
has brought against businesses for failing to provide adequate data
protection have been based upon section 5 of the FTC Act, and these
claims are deeply grounded in contract principles.222 In fact, they are
almost exclusively rooted in contract principles because a person
doesn’t own his or her personal information, and as of yet, there is
not a strong constitutional right protecting privacy. While contract
law is an effective means of regulating data security, the problem
with rights under contracts is that such rights can be forfeited by
agreement. One can easily imagine a situation where an individual
must forego data security or a right to sue in order to receive a
company’s product or business. This happens quite often now with
contracts requiring an individual to enter into arbitration, and
foregoing his or her right to bring suit. If such a right can be
contracted away, the whole idea of the right of redress falls on its
face. Even though spreading the responsibility of enforcement
between government and citizens may be a good alternative to
increased government intervention, in the end, such an idea may fail
to be effective because the right to sue can be contracted away.
B. Room for a U.S. Data Protection Agency
In borrowing from the EU model, the U.S. should not only
increase government enforcement into its policy, it should also form
a data protection agency. If this were to happen, it would help the
U.S. model to effectively enforce data protection laws. One problem
with the current model is that there are many different divisions, from
the FTC to NTIA to the ITA to NIST, that handle data protection;
this despite the fact that what is really needed is one coordinated and
streamlined agency. Another problem with the current model is that
221
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the two main agencies that handle data protection issues at present,
the FTC and the Department of Commerce, have other duties
requiring agency focus, so they have to divide their time among their
many responsibilities.
Clearly, the FTC and Department of
Commerce first started handling data protection issues because most
laws that protect consumer information are aimed at business sectors.
Thus, it would initially seem that the FTC and Department of
Commerce are better equipped to handle issues of data protection.
But we must also keep in mind that these two bodies handle a variety
of different issues, and it is unlikely that these two agencies will be
able to adapt quickly to changes in technology. In order to
effectively enforce data protection, a lot of time, effort, and
manpower will be needed. This may have the effect of spreading
these two agencies thin. It will have the result of either detracting
from their other duties, or they will not be able to effectively enforce
data protection laws.
With laws at both the federal and state levels that target
numerous sectors, an agency with a sole focus on data protection
would be more adept at identifying and resolving problems. The red
tape and inefficiency involved with having multiple data agencies
effectively maims any enforcement measures that the government
would take. Consolidating the data protection tasks into one unit
would help the government act as a coordinated body.
So if a data protection agency were formed, what would it
look like? An examination of the UK and French data protection
agencies show that the agency must have teeth. The easiest way to
give an agency power is to give it the ability to penalize breaches
through fines. Without the power to fine, an agency will not have the
power it needs to be effective. While this idea of fining data
breaches would be a new practice in the U.S., it wouldn’t be much
different from the accepted U.S. practice of fining corporations for
breaches of environmental law.223 Thus, it wouldn’t be such a radical
idea as to be unacceptable to U.S. citizens. However, like the
European data agencies, there should be a limit to the amount for
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which a company can be fined if it fails to provide reasonable data
protection. Fines should not be so low as to amount to a slap on the
wrist, but the data protection agency also should not be given a carte
blanche and hand out astronomical fines.
Finally, such an agency must be independent from
government, because in the end, the agency’s purpose is to look after
citizens’ rights. It must be on guard against infringements on such
rights, whether the stifling of those rights comes from government or
private parties. In France, CNIL is so intertwined with government
that it seems to lose focus on its original purpose of protecting
citizens’ rights. It protects citizens from businesses, but many
perceive the CNIL as inadequately protecting them from government.
C. Prevention First
Also, like the EU data protection agencies, the main focus of
the U.S. data protection agency should be to prevent breaches.
Currently, the FTC and the Department of Commerce only act to
identify breaches that have already been made rather than identifying
potential breaches. In contrast, the ICO as well as CNIL both assess
company compliance to data protection laws and focus mainly on
preventing data breaches by ensuring that the rules are being
followed. So, in this way, the U.S. policy is more concerned with
penalizing breaches rather than preventing them through assessments
and performance reviews, contrary to the EU policy. Even without a
data protection agency, the U.S. should still borrow this EU notion of
prevention. Data security is becoming more of an issue with courts
and agencies are applying various laws in new ways. For instance,
the FTC’s recent interpretation of FTC Act section 5 as applying to
security breaches as an unfair trade practice224 was a novel approach
that was not communicated to companies. If companies had been put
on notice, it is possible that there may have been changes that would
have benefitted consumers and the companies that were in breach of
this “unfair trade practice.” In light of this, it would be helpful for
companies to be warned before the law is applied in a novel way. If
agencies were focused on prevention and performing assessments,
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companies would have notice about what is expected of them and,
hopefully, would be less susceptible to breaching data security laws.
VII. POSSIBLE CRITIQUES OF “MIDDLE ROAD” CONCEPT
Even though this “middle-road” idea may seem odd
considering that the U.S. and EU models approach data protection
from different ends of the spectrum, the idea will be workable. It is
important to note that the two models are considered as radically
different from each other only because the EU provides that privacy
is a fundamental right while the U.S. does not. So, even though the
EU policy may seem to conflict with U.S. policy, the U.S. will still
be able to integrate some EU ideas into its current policy without
creating contradictions.
If the U.S. were to adopt the EU’s stance on government
intervention, create a data protection agency, and focus on prevention
of data breaches, the new changes would translate to the U.S. system.
Some may argue that this would give too much control to the
government, but one must keep in mind that some sacrifices have to
be made in order to obtain benefits. It all boils down to the task of
balancing the value of data protection against the value of moderate
governmental intrusion. Thus far, the U.S. policy has tried to find a
way in which it will not have to make any sacrifices—attempting to
find a way in which it can have a hands-off government and adequate
data protection. This desire to have the best of both worlds simply
isn’t feasible and proof that it isn’t feasible lies in the state of U.S.
data protection today. Self-regulation overly burdens companies
because it expects a business to act as a neutral party to protect
customer rights, even though businesses are anything but an
indifferent party. Such an approach is not practical.
In balancing the right of data privacy protection against that
of governmental intrusion, we must look at the level of governmental
intrusion that is acceptable in the U.S. If the U.S. were to step in
with a data protection agency and increase its regulation of data
security, it wouldn’t be any different from the FCC stepping in and
regulating media225 or the FTC regulating consumer rights.
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Weighing this against protection of sensitive information, it would
seem that data protection might outweigh the accepted practice of
moderate government intrusion. Consumer information is highly
sensitive and may create lasting problems if it gets into the wrong
hands. In addition, modern technology allows information to be
gathered quickly and in vast amounts. The gravity of harm that could
be done to a multitude of people may outweigh the accepted practice
of government regulation. Further, while heavier enforcement than
the current level will not be overly welcome, it wouldn’t be that great
of a departure from our current system.226 The FTC has been
increasing its regulation of data protection, so an increase in
enforcement will not vary greatly from the way the system runs now.
VIII. CONCLUSION
No system is perfect and the U.S. model of data protection is
not an exception. However, one can be encouraged that the U.S. has
a strong framework upon which to build. While we do not need to
duplicate the EU model, there are several portions of the European
model that we should borrow. With stronger enforcement and early
detection of mistakes in data security, the U.S. will have a system
that provides its citizens with the informational security that is
needed in today’s ever-changing world.
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